This paper presents a theory, where managers can use the liquidity of securities as a choice variable to screen for "deep pocket" investors, those that have a low likelihood of facing a liquidity shock. We assume that there is information asymmetry about the quality of the manager between the existing investors and the market. The manager then faces a "lemons" problem when he has to raise funds for a subsequent fund from outside investors, since the outsiders cannot determine whether the manager is of poor quality or the existing investors were hit by a liquidity shock. Thus, liquid investors can reduce the manager's cost of capital in future fund-raising. We test the assumptions and predictions of our model in the context of the private equity industry. Consistent with the theory, we find that transfer restrictions on investors are less common in later funds organized by the same private equity firm, where information problems are presumably less severe. Also, partnerships whose investment focus is in industries with longer investment cycles display more transfer constraints. Finally, we present evidence consistent with the assumptions of our model, including the high degree of continuity in the investors of successive funds and the ability of sophisticated investors to anticipate funds that will have poor subsequent performance.
Introduction
Economists have long argued that liquidity is a mixed blessing. On the one hand, liquidity provides a number of benefits for investors. For example, more liquid assets can provide positive incentive effects through improved performance measurement and more informativeness of stock prices (see, for example, Holmström and Tirole (1993) , Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (1999) and Scharfstein and Stein (2000) ). Greater liquidity also allows investors to easily redirect funds toward more efficient uses (as highlighted in the literature on liquidity shocks in the tradition of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) ). On the other hand, the literature has also identified costs of investor liquidity. Most of these papers rely on the intuition that increased liquidity reduces the incentives for large shareholders to fulfill their monitoring role (as in Bhide (1993) and Aghion, Bolton, and Tirole (2000) ).
The current paper examines a rationale for liquidity that is quite distinct from the governancebased stories that have dominated the earlier literature. We present a model where a manager of a private equity firm explicitly chooses the degree of illiquidity of shares to screen for investors with long horizons. Investors who expect to face many liquidity shocks in the future would find these restrictions especially onerous and therefore would avoid investing. The benefits of having liquid investors become apparent once the firm has to go back to the market to raise new capital.
If the original investors do not reinvest because of a liquidity shock, the outside investors cannot distinguish whether the initial investors truly faced a liquidity shock or whether they have learned that the fund is a "lemon." Transfer constraints de facto allow the manager to trade off increased cost of capital in early fund raising against lower cost in future fund raising by minimizing the lemons problem with respect to the outside market.
The novel contribution of our model is that we analyze illiquidity as a choice variable, which can be influenced by the manager of the fund and allows him to screen for "deep pocket" investors.
Thus, illiquidity here is not the symptom of an underlying asymmetric information problem as it is in most of the asset pricing literature on liquidity. Instead, we model illiquidity as an outcome of the general partners' optimization problem. It is important to point out that the intuition of our model is driven by the information asymmetry between inside and outside investors and not by the fact that a private equity fund might face large transaction costs if it was forced to liquidate prematurely. The transfer of equity stakes is independent of the capital commitment to the fund.
We motivate the analysis by considering a setting where the monitoring role of large investors is much less important, but severe restrictions on liquidity are commonplace: private equity limited partnerships. Three observations inspire our analysis. First, limited partners in U.S. private equity funds typically have very limited rights and incentives to influence or direct the funds' activities. 1 Even though in some cases investors can, for example, vote to dissolve the fund, this hardly ever occurs.
Second, private equity investors require wide ranging information rights that allow them to monitor the performance of the fund. Usually, investors meet with their general partners on a regular basis to discuss the progress of the portfolio firms. In dealing with unsatisfactory funds, the response of institutional investors is typically to not invest in the subsequent funds raised by the private equity organization: all the limited partners we talked to confirmed that they choose exit over voice when they are dissatisfied with the performance of a fund. The investors' effort to monitor the fund is largely driven by the desire to get better information that informs the reinvestment decision.
Third, serious limitations on the transferability of partnership interests -far beyond what is
required by securities law -are commonplace. The presence of these curbs is particularly puzzling, since partnership interests are very illiquid to start with, due to the large stakes held by each limited partner. 2 We believe that the choice of liquidity as a screening device is a more general phenomenon, which applies to a number of situations involving security design. Examples include other private partnerships, such as real estate investment funds and private placements raised by public companies. One illustration are the so-called PIPE transactions (Private Investments in Public Entities), which involve a public company raising capital from a private investor, often a hedge fund. Similarly, Warren Buffett of Berkshire-Hathaway allegedly resists splitting the stock of his fund (an individual share is currently trading at a value above $2000) because he wants to make his fund only accessible to wealthy individuals who have long horizons.
This intuition also has relevance in many other settings in corporate finance. Consider, for 1 At least in part, this reluctance is rooted in the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, which links the shielding of the limited partners from liability for the partnership's activities to their non-involvement in the day-to-day management of the fund.
2 In fact, recently there have been a number of attempts in the investment banking community to issue debt-like securities that are backed by private equity returns to circumvent these constraints.
example, a biotechnology start-up that has the choice of either undertaking an IPO or raising capital in a strategic alliance with a large pharmaceutical company. The former solution often provides a lower cost of capital in the short run, particularly if the IPO market is hot. One of the reasons why we observe the heavy dependence on strategic alliances in biotechnology might be that start-ups want to secure very liquid investors with long horizons, who will be more likely to provide follow-on financing.
We then turn to an empirical examination of the testable predictions of our theory based on a sample of about 250 private equity partnership agreements. We show that, consistent with our model, the restrictions on limited partners' ability to transfer funds are less common in later funds organized by the same private equity group, where information problems are presumably less severe.
Also, private equity partnerships whose investment focus is in industries with longer investment cycles display more transfer constraints. Funds that invest in businesses that take a long time before they produce observable results are prone to increased information asymmetry. In congruence with our theory, these funds are more concerned about preventing transfers of equity stakes. For example, we find that funds specializing in the biotechnology investments have more transfer constraints, while those focused on software and the Internet have fewer constraints. We argue that these findings are consistent with the idea that in situations where asymmetric information problems are more severe for future fund raising, there will be more emphasis on selecting long-horizon investors.
Another interesting finding is that contracts by California venture capital partnerships are much less likely to employ many restrictive provisions. One interpretation of this result is that in the close-knit California venture community information on the relative performance of funds may be more readily ascertained.
We also empirically examine two crucial assumptions of our model: (1) that limited partners can learn about the quality of the funds in which they invest and thus have inside information, and (2) that there is substantial persistence in the composition of limited partners between different funds of a private equity organization. We find support for the first assumption using data on the private equity investments of two large and sophisticated limited partners. We focus on their decisions to reinvest or discontinue commitments to partnerships. We show that these LPs on average discontinue funds that have lower returns, while those that were reinvested experience higher returns subsequently. These findings indicate that private equity investors are able to acquire inside information about the funds they are involved in through the investment process. Furthermore, in line with our theoretical assumptions, we find that funds that were discontinued subsequently raise smaller funds, which might reflect the fact that the departure of an inside investor signals negative information to the outside market. Second, we show that there is a considerable degree of continuity in the limited partners in the successive funds of private equity organizations. Finally, we examine a possible alternative explanation for the patterns seen here: that the use of transferability constraints may be a mechanism through which general partners prohibit "loose cannon" troublemakers from investing in their funds. Established GPs may have less to fear from such LPs, and thus make less use of these mechanisms. We present both anecdotal and large-sample evidence that is inconsistent with this alternative explanation.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The second section considers the institutional setting of private equity, and discusses an illustrative case. We present the model in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the data and the analysis of private equity contracts. Section 5 discusses the supplemental analyses. The final section concludes the paper.
Institutional Setting
We suggest in the introduction that private equity is an environment to examine the costs and benefits of liquidity as a screening mechanism, as it presents a setting where the traditional rationale for illiquidity -the need for governance -is not present. This section discusses this setting at greater length.
Private equity funds typically are raised in the form of limited partnerships. Unlike corporations, these partnerships have finite lives, typically ten years (though extensions of a few years may be possible). The general partners (the private equity fund's managers) invest the capital raised from limited partners, typically large institutional and individual investors, in entrepreneurial or restructuring funds. After the firms go public or are sold, the proceeds (whether in the form of equity or cash) are divided between the limited and general partners, leading to a close alignment of the incentives of the two parties. For a more detailed discussion of private equity funds, see Gompers and Lerner (1999b) .
Conversations with limited and general partners of private equity funds suggest that the re-strictions on the transferability of limited partnership interests are motivated in large part by the adverse effects that such transfers can have on the operations of the funds. The recurring theme that we heard when talking to practitioners is that GPs want to avoid partnership stakes ending up in the hands of unsophisticated investors without a long-term commitment to the asset class, which is in line with the argument of this paper. A number of the seasoned practitioners pointed to the experience of the early private equity funds: most funds were freely tradable between the 1940s and 1960s. 3 A review of historical materials regarding the pioneering venture capital fund American Research and Development (ARD) 4 suggests that the liquidity of the fund had a number of adverse effects. For instance, raising additional capital proved to be highly dillutive for existing shareholders. When ARD sought to raise additional capital in 1958 to finance their investment in Digital Equipment Corporation (which ultimately accounted for the majority of their portfolio gains), they were required to sell shares at a price that was nearly 40% below the fund's net asset value (and even further below the fund's true value).
By way of contrast, we did not hear any support for a story where transfer constraints exist to create greater involvement of LPs. Usually this does not constitute an important consideration for two reasons. First, investments by private equity funds are typically highly illiquid, and difficult to salvage for an attractive price. Thus, even if the limited partners were to step in and force a liquidation of a fund, they would be unlikely to get much of a return for their effort. This lack of active involvement in the fund's day-to-day activities, however, does not preclude the limited partners from gathering important information about the quality and performance of the general partners running the fund. This interaction allows the LPs to develop an informed opinion about the quality of the partnership and its general partners. If the partnership turns out to be of low quality, LPs will avoid investing in any further funds organized by the problematic organization.
Second, the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (U.L.P.A.), which has been enacted in its original or revised form in 48 of the 50 states (Harroch, 1998) , restricts the ability of limited partners to become involved with the day-to-day operations of the fund. Under this act, the limited partner's liability is limited to the amount of capital contributed to the partnership, as long as that partner does not "participate in the control of the business." 5 As a result, limited partners who exercise supervisory authority or other management control over the partnerships in which they invest may endanger their limited liability status, a grave concern for any investor. 6
Finally, securities and tax regulations certainly play a role in the decision to restrict the transferability of limited partnership interests. Funds try to avoid coming under the provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940, which imposes costly disclosure requirements on the GPs. Similarly, if the stakes of a limited partnership were freely traded, the fund would be taxed at the partnership as well as the LP level, which would be especially detrimental since many investors of private equity funds are tax-exempt entities. Most practitioners and legal scholars agree, however, that the level of control over transfer constraints imposed in most partnership agreements are far in excess of what would be required to comply with securities and tax law. Please refer to the Appendix for a detailed discussion of the tax implications and legal constraints affecting limited partnerships.
A Model of Transferability Restrictions in Private Equity
Why would a venture capitalist place restrictions on the transferability of partnership stakes? At face value, such restrictions reduce the liquidity of partnership stakes and should therefore diminish their value, since limited partners, even very liquid ones, want to be compensated for the lack of liquidity. In this section, we propose a simple model that explains why a venture capitalist can actually benefit from such restrictions in the long run, even though they may in the short run reduce value by requiring the GPs to pay a liquidity premium to investors.
The basic idea is that transfer restrictions are used to screen for limited partners with long horizons. Imagine that LPs differ in their likelihood to face liquidity shocks and thus in their likelihood of being forced to sell their partnership stakes. LPs with a higher propensity of liquidity 5 Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act 303(a). The U.L.P.A. uses the phrase "take part." 6 For a discussion of these issues, see Burr (1982) and Feld (1969) . These strictures may be relaxed by the creation of limited liability corporations (LLCs), hybrid structures that were first introduced in 1977. Given the novelty of these structures and the size of the potential downside, limited partners have been reluctant to assume a more active governance role, even in funds organized as LLCs.
shocks would find these restrictions especially onerous and, therefore, would be less inclined to invest in these funds than those with a lower likelihood of liquidity shocks, everything else equal.
We assume that ex ante GPs do not know which investors are liquid and which ones are not, but the LPs know about their own commitment to the asset class. By imposing these restrictions in the first place, the GP is guaranteed a pool of LPs that are especially liquid.
Liquid limited partners are beneficial for the GP because of the repeated game nature of the fund raising process. GPs normally raise new funds every few years. If the GP has investors with "deep pockets," he will not need to go back to the capital market for future fundraising. Therefore, the GP trades off the current cost of equity against the benefits from insuring future access to the capital market. As we will show, the higher the benefits from raising a follow-on fund, the more this tradeoff tilts in the direction of imposing transfer constraints, everything else equal.
We assume that incumbent investors obtain inside information about the quality of the GP during their time of involvement with the first fund. Given that GPs do not need to disclose any information about their performance to the general public, the best way to find out about the quality and returns of a fund is by being invested in it. Therefore, insiders are natural candidates to invest in the GP's next fund, if the GP turns out to be a high type. Consequently, the GP faces an adverse selection problem in the outside market. If an incumbent limited partner has a liquidity shock, the GP is forced to go to outside investors. These outsiders will wonder why incumbent investors passed on the new fund. They cannot differentiate whether the incumbent investors passed because of liquidity reasons or because the fund is a "lemon." Therefore, outside investors will charge a higher cost of capital than an insider who knows the quality of the GP. This assumption, which we believe accurately describes the private equity fundraising process, provides the central source of asymmetric information in our model. 7
Note that we also rule out strategic behavior of the general partner in the first period by assuming that his quality is unknown to the investors as well as to the GP himself. This assumption 7 An extension of the model that has been suggested could be to introduce heterogeneity in the level of sophistication of the limited partners. If "deep pocket" investors are also better at differentiating high quality venture capitalists from low quality ones, more liquid LPs might select better funds. This approach would only undo the logic of our model, however, if the correlation between "deep pockets" and better information was perfectly correlated. In this extreme case, liquid LPs select the best funds and lower quality funds are left with less sophisticated (and, according to this assumption, more illiquid) investors. Thus, in equilibrium there would be no need for screening by the private equity funds. Since we do not feel that this is a realistic description of the private equity investment process, we abstract from this extension.
is supported by many observers of the venture capital fundraising cycle. Even GPs that have long and successful track records as entrepreneurs or managers in established companies prior to joining (or raising) a fund often struggle to succeed in private equity. Moreover, a recent paper by Gompers and Lerner (1999a) 
Setup
Our model has two players: a general partner (GP) and a limited partner (LP). While we only model a single LP for simplicity, we will be implicitly assuming that there are many LPs and, therefore, the GP has all the bargaining power. 8
The GP wants to raise a fixed amount of capital I to finance a first fund. Since we are interested in how screening for investors affects future costs of capital, we will assume he plans to raise a second fund in the future. There are two types of GPs in the population, a good type (with probability p) and a bad type (with probability 1 − p). A good GP's fund will be worth V G > 0, whereas a bad venture capitalist's fund will be worth 0. Both types receive a private benefit, B, from running the fund. This guarantees that even if the venture capitalist knew that he was a bad type, he would choose to raise a new fund. We assume that at the time of raising the first fund neither LP nor GP know whether the GP is of high or low type.
Since I dollars need to be raised, the GP and the LP must agree on what fraction of the firm, π, the LP will receive in return for her I dollars of investment. 9 LPs also come in two types.
Illiquid LPs (who occur with probability q) face a liquidity shock with probability λ 1 and liquid ones (probability 1 − q) face it with probability λ 2 < λ 1 . We assume that ex ante GPs do not know the type of the LP, but LPs know their likelihood of having a liquidity shock. A liquidity shock means the investor must sell her shares (and cannot invest in new shares); she will incur a cost c.
One can motivate this either as the utility cost of being unable to liquidate the shares right away or the dollar cost of having to sell the stakes at a much lower value. For simplicity, we normalize the interest rate in the market to be zero. In the first period, the GP raises money for the first fund. At this point, the GP and the LP agree on the share π 1 that the LP will receive in exchange for her investment. At this point, the type of the GP is unknown to both parties, but only the LP knows whether he is a liquid or illiquid type.
2. In the second period, the investor may face a liquidity shock. Since at this point, she does not know yet whether the fund she has invested in is a good fund or a bad fund, she faces no lemons problem when trying to sell the stake.
3. In the third period, both parties learn the type of the GP. With probability p, the general partner is a good type. Since the actual returns of the fund are only realized after the second fund has been raised, outside investors do not receive information about the quality of the GP.
4. Subsequently, in the last period a new fund is raised. The GP may either go to the outside market to raise funds or may rely on incumbent investors, depending on their liquidity and his type. The cost of capital in this period will be called π M 2 if he goes to the market and π I 2 if incumbent investors finance the next fund. 10
Solving the Model
The GP's optimization problem is to maximize his profits from both funds. He has to choose whether he will impose a liquidity constraint in the first period or not. Therefore, we solve the model by computing profits with and without restrictions and then comparing the two scenarios.
In both cases, we will use backwards induction to solve the model.
No Restriction
If the GP places no restriction, he will raise funds from both types of LPs, liquid and illiquid ones. 11
In the fourth period, the GP's cost of capital will depend on whether he is a good type or a bad type. Only if the GP turns out to be a good type, is the incumbent investor willing to invest at the cost of capital:
The GP must go to the outside market if either the incumbent investor receives a liquidity shock or if the GP turns out to be a bad type, since then the inside investors will not be willing to reinvest. The market cannot differentiate between these two cases, and will charge a lemons premium in both cases. 12
The cost of capital for the GP now is:
In the first period, the GP faces a cost of capital independent of his type since it is unknown:
Therefore, the GP's overall profits are:
Each of these terms is easy to interpret. The first term is the expected profit plus private benefits in the first period. The second term is the profit plus private benefits if the GP turns out to be good (probability p) and the incumbent investor does not have a liquidity shock (probability
The third line describes the profits if the GP is good but the incumbent investor gets a liquidity shock (probability λ 1 q + λ 2 (1 − q)), forcing the GP to go to the market.
The final term is the payoff if the GP turns out to be bad and has to go to the market. Notice he will only receive the private benefits since the project will be worth nothing.
With Restriction
Now let us analyze the case when the GP imposes transfer restrictions in the first period. We model this as inflicting a cost c whenever the LP wants to sell. 13 Then LPs with low probability of a liquidity shock will be more inclined to invest in the fund. Again, the cost of capital in the second period will depend on the GP's type. If he is a good type and the LP did not face a liquidity shock, the cost of capital is:
This is parallel to the case with no restriction, but note that the probability of obtaining financing from insiders is now higher, since the GP has screened out the illiquid LPs.
Again, there are two cases when the GP needs to raise funds from the outside market: either he is a bad type or the inside investor has a liquidity shock. In this case, his cost of capital is:
Note that the cost of capital in the outside market is now much higher than in the case with no restrictions. The market knows that the LP has a low probability of a liquidity shock and thus puts more weight on the possibility that the GP is a bad type. 14 If the liquid LP has a very low likelihood of facing a liquidity shock (λ 2 < I(1−p) (V G −I)p ), now it becomes impossible for the GP to raise any follow-on financing from the outside market. The market will think that almost surely the GP must be a bad type, if the inside investor passes on the next fund. In the paper we analyze the case where the GP is unable to obtain financing from the outside market. In the first period, the GP's cost of capital is equal to the case with no restrictions:
Now the GP's overall profits are:
Each of these terms is parallel to the case with no restrictions. The first term is the expected profit plus private benefits in the first period, minus the liquidity premium that the GP has to pay the limited partners for incurring the transfer restrictions. The second term is the profit plus the private benefits if the GP turns out to be good (probability p) and the incumbent investor does not have a liquidity shock (probability (1 − λ 2 )). Because the transfer restrictions screen out investors with high frequency of liquidity shocks, the probability of achieving insider financing in the second period is much higher than in the case with no restrictions. In contrast, the third and fourth lines show the costs of transferability constraints. The GP's profits are zero if he is a good type but the incumbent investor gets a liquidity shock (probability λ 2 p), since he cannot get any financing from the outside market. Notice that the GP also foregoes his private benefits since he cannot obtain financing for a follow-on fund.
14 Alternatively, we could imagine that the outside market has no way of knowing the composition of the limited partners that invested in the first period. In this case, the venture capitalist who imposed transfer constraints in the first fund faces the same cost of capital when he has to go to the market as a fund that did not screen for liquid investors, since the market cannot differentiate between them. This simplifies the trade-off for the GP: he only trades off a liquidity premium in the first period with reduced likelihood of having to go to the market in the second, when he imposes constraints. The results are qualitatively unchanged but imposing transfer constraints is more attractive.
When is it Profitable to Impose Transfer Restrictions?
The difference in profits when there is a restriction relative to when there is none is:
Each of these terms is intuitive. The first term reflects the benefits of having liquid investors. If the GP turns out to be good, then he benefits from having a reduced probability of a liquidity shock.
The second term is the liquidity premium. The liquid investor still faces a shock with probability λ 2 , so she will need to have her initial investment cover this shock. The third term reflects the worsening of the lemons problem in the outside market caused by the restriction.
There are several things to note here. First, the above result only depends on λ 2 , the likelihood that the liquid investor receives a liquidity shock, but not on λ 1 , the likelihood that the illiquid investor receives a liquidity shock. λ 1 does not enter the result, since the benefits of imposing transfer restrictions (and thus only having liquid investors, λ 2 ) are calculated relative to the benchmark case when both types of LPs invest. Second, consider the following comparative statics. Suppose that the private benefits of control are small (B→ 0) and that the liquid investor rarely receives liquidity shocks (λ 2 → 0). This makes the costs of placing a transfer restriction small and also increases the benefit of the restriction. Thus, in this case the GP will want to impose a restriction.
Alternatively, imagine that the pool of LPs is composed mainly of liquid investors (q → 0). Then it will be unprofitable to place a restriction: there are few illiquid investors to screen out but the GP would still have to pay the liquidity premium (λ 2 c). Similarly, if all GPs were high types (p → 1), placing a restriction would be unprofitable. These comparative statics underscore the rationale for restrictions: by screening for liquid investors, transfer constraints reduce the adverse selection that the GP will face when raising funds in the second period. 15
Extension: Intensity of Information Asymmetry
In this section we present a simple extension of the model to capture the notion that there are differences in the severity of asymmetric information between the outside investors and the inside investors. 16 For this purpose, we assume that with probability (1-x) outside investors will know the type of the GP in period four (when the new fund is being raised): i.e., there will be no information asymmetry between the insiders and the market. With probability x, outside investors do not learn the type of the GP, and therefore the above described information asymmetry holds. The GP's overall profits are parallel to the previous section, but in the second period we now have to take into account that the GP will face information asymmetry in the outside market only with probability x, while with probability (1-x) the GP will face a situation where the outside market is fully informed about his type. In this case, the GP will be able to raise capital from the market (inside or outside investors) at the low cost of capital π I 2 if he is a good type. If he turns out to be a low type, however, he will now not be able to go to the market at all. In the case with no information asymmetry, the bad types lose the ability to hide their type by pooling with the high type GPs that are hit by a liquidity shock of their investors.
Finally, the difference in profits between the case with and without restrictions is now:
Interestingly, we see that imposing a transfer restriction becomes more beneficial the higher the likelihood that the outside investors will not be informed, i.e., the more likely is the existence of asymmetric information problems between inside and outside investors. If x equals one, outside investors are always uninformed and the solution is equal to the results of the last section. As x approaches zero the difference in profits between the case with restrictions and the case without becomes unambiguously negative (−λ2c). Intuitively, if there are no asymmetric information problems, it is never beneficial to impose transfer constraints, since there are no benefits from imposing them, but the LP still has to be compensated for the liquidity premium. This extension of the model provides an interesting testable implication: in situations where GPs are less prone to asymmetric information (e.g. because they have a longer track record) we should expect to see fewer transfer constraints.
Analysis of Partnership Agreements 4.1 Estimation Strategy
The model we developed in Section 3 generates a number of testable predictions. A central argument is that limited partnerships should be most concerned about restricting the liquidity of their stakes when the asymmetric information problem between the market and inside investors is greatest.
We argue that this information gap is affected by a number of characteristics. These include the sequence number of the fund, the type of assets that the fund manages, and the geographic location of the fund. These characteristics should in turn affect the tightness of transfer restrictions. According to our model, contracts should be most restrictive for the initial funds that a private equity firm raises, since at this point the asymmetric information is most severe. We expect that transfer restrictions become less stringent with each additional fund. 17
Another factor that might impact the amount of asymmetric information private equity firms face is the ease with which the underlying assets of the fund can be valued. Holding everything else constant, our model would predict that funds whose assets are more difficult to value by an outsider should have tighter transfer restrictions. Funds that invest in sectors that take a long time to produce observable results might be prone to increased information asymmetries. Therefore, we classify funds into four industry categories: pharmaceutical, business services, telecommunications, and software/Internet. We posit that start-ups in the pharmaceutical industries take a much longer time before they have observable products than start-ups in software and Internet-related businesses.
Our model also implies that in environments in which information is transferred more easily, we should observe fewer restrictions on liquidity. Of course, it is very difficult to measure differences in information diffusion, and any proxy for these must obviously be coarse and incomplete.
One potential dimension along which the informational environment of private equity funds varies is "local culture." A well-known study on this topic by Saxenian (1994) analyzes the social and informational networks between the Silicon Valley venture capital community and that of Massachusetts' Route 128. Her findings suggest that information is shared much more extensively and 17 One consideration that may make it harder for us to find any effects is the tendency for many private equity groups to simply "recycle" their partnership agreements from fund to fund, rather than carefully examining the appropriateness of the features. For examples of such contractual rigidity in other settings, see Pittmann (1991) . diffuses more rapidly in the close-knit Silicon Valley community than in Massachusetts. Similarly, Stuart and Sorenson (2002) show that geographic proximity is an important source of knowledge spillovers in the venture capital community. In particular, states with low enforceability of employee non-competition clauses, such as California, have high labor turnover, which leads to the easier diffusion of information. In the context of our model, we expect fewer transfer restrictions for funds based in California. 18 An important caveat for our cross-sectional tests is that the type of assets in which funds invest is a choice variable. Imagine that private partnerships have different, unobserved abilities to alleviate asymmetric information problems with respect to the broader market. If the funds optimally choose the type of investments that are most suited to their type, in equilibrium we might not observe any difference in the liquidity of partnership stakes between the funds. We believe, however, that the self-selection problem is less severe than it first appears, since private equity organizations' existing networks largely prevent general partners from freely moving between locations and industries.
Given these limitations, however, the cross-sectional results should be treated only as suggestive evidence for our theory.
Data
The sample consists of 243 private equity funds whose partnership agreements we were able to access and analyze. Since these documents are not publicly accessible, we rely on the collections of a number of institutional and individual investors. Because we wish to avoid undesirable heterogeneity (e.g., the impact of other nations' securities laws), we eliminated funds that were not U.S.-based private equity partnerships. Gompers and Lerner (1996) uses a subset of these partnership contracts to analyze how the use of covenants restricts the behavior of general partners.
We collect a variety of supplemental information from other sources. We determined the age of the private equity organization, the location of its primary office, and the number of previous funds from Asset Alternatives (2001 ), Venture Economics (1995 , and private placement memoranda used to raise funds. The partnership agreements we collected from LPs are diverse.
18 It should be acknowledged that many East Coast-based venture capital groups also have offices in California. But in general, venture organizations tend to make the bulk of their investments near their primary offices. Of course, there might also be a number of other explanations why contracts have developed differently between California and the East Coast, but it is important to note that partnership law is quite uniform nation-wide, due to the widespread promulgation of the U.L.P.A.
Some were very established private equity investors, who have access to some of the most prestigious funds in the industry. Other limited partners are less established, and consequently, tend to invest in younger and less prestigious private equity organizations.
As Table 1 Table 2 provides an overview of the many different contract provisions that private equity firms use to restrict potential transfers of partnership stakes or the nature of the transferee. Most strikingly, almost 90 percent of the funds in our sample require that the "general partner must approve of the transfer," which effectively allows the general partners to prevent any transfer that conflicts with their interests. There are, however, specific exemptions that allow LPs to transfer stakes (as discussed in the next paragraph) that override the GP's need for approval.
Descriptive Statistics
Most provisions fall into one of three broad classes. First, most partnership contracts include several provisions that explicitly allow the transfer of stakes to certain kinds of investors or in specific, well-defined circumstances. For example, 36 percent of the contracts stipulate that transfers are allowed to sophisticated investors, 43 percent of the funds allow the transfer to family members, and 28 percent permit the transfer of stakes to other limited partners. Other, more customized provisions include the permission to sell partnership shares after bankruptcy (in 3 percent of the funds) or to a spouse after a divorce, in 13 percent. 19 Second, many partnership contracts contain detailed provisions controlling the actual process by which shares can get sold. For example, about 10 percent of our funds have restrictions on the number of potential investors that can buy a partnership stake in the secondary market. We also find that about 30 percent of the funds require that the limited partner's entire share has to be sold in any transaction or that stakes can be sold to at most one person.
Finally, the third set of restrictions reflects the private equity firms' regulatory environment. Table 2 shows that in the majority of partnership agreements, transfers cannot add regulatory and tax requirements, or lead to a termination of the partnership. It should be noted that while only 64% of the agreements have a general clause that the transfers cannot violate the law, the same protective function can be achieved through more specific clauses as well. These curbs are due to concerns with the Investment Company Act of 1940 and other securities legislation. 20
Constructing Composite Measures
The descriptive statistics document the complexity of the contract terms. It would be misleading to analyze each of these contract provisions separately, since no one single term governs the transferability of limited partnership interests by itself. Thus, to assess the extent to which the agreements either facilitate or hinder the transfer of limited partnership interests, we focus on a number of different composite measures that aggregate the information in the partnership agreements. The composite measures we employ take several forms. Table 2 shows which provisions are included in these composite measures. First, we add all relevant terms, giving a +1 score for terms that enhance the transferability of limited partnership interests or otherwise protect the interests of the limited partners, −1 for terms that limit transfers, and 0 if such a term is not included. The second measure simply sums up the most direct provisions: the number of different types of investors to whom the limited partners are allowed to transfer their interests. The next measure is the sum of the three contract provisions that most explicitly give the general partners the ability to control the liquidity of partnership interests. Specifically, 19 It is interesting to note that the latter provision is mainly found in California-based partnerships. 20 We want to point out one potential source of measurement error in our data. In some cases, very powerful limited partners obtain side letters from their private equity funds that grant them certain exemptions. Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to collect information about these side deals. Our intuition, however, is that this should not affect our data too much. These limited partners are normally the ones where there is no need for screening liquidity.
these are the requirements that the general partner approve the transfer, that the general partner approve of the limited partner status of the transferee, and that any transfer cannot conflict with the general partner's interests. The final measure, which we call complexity, summarizes all the contract provisions regarding transferability, no matter whether they enhance the LP's or the GP's prerogatives. This measure is intended to capture the level of detail and intricacy with which general partners and limited partners address this issue. Table 2 summarizes the four variables analyzed in the remainder of this section. The frequency of each contractual term is reported in the first column of the table. The second through fifth columns indicate whether a term is employed in each of the four independent variables constructed here, and if it is regarded as a positive or negative contribution to the total. 21
Results
Table 3 provides a first look at general patterns in the use of transferability provisions in limited partnership agreements. The cross-tabulations suggest that later funds raised by private equity groups tend to have more provisions that enhance the transfer of partnerships by LPs. But they also have more provisions that allow GPs to control the transfers. Limited partner-friendly terms also appear to be associated with early-stage venture funds, older groups, those based in California, and those established in the later years of the sample. Our interpretation of these patterns, however, must be cautious due to the univariate nature of these comparisons.
To test the hypotheses of our model we estimate the following baseline regression:
The different composite measures of transferability that were discussed in Section 4 are regressed on the sequence number of the fund, dummy variables indicating whether a partnership raises a buyout or early stage venture capital fund, and controls for the size of the fund, as measured by the logarithm of committed capital. We also include year fixed effects (the year the fund had its final closing) and in some regressions fixed effects for each private equity organization. All standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the private equity group level. Table 4 presents the results using the composite measure of transferability as the dependent variable. The coefficient on the sequence variable is large and statistically significant, with a point estimate of 0.09 and a standard error of 0.04 in the first column. At the mean of the independent variables, a one standard deviation increase in fund sequence translates into a 15 percent increase in the composite measure of transferability. As the second column suggests, the relationship between the ease of transferability and the sequence number of the fund remains robust when additional independent variables are added. One exception is when the year in which the private equity organization was established (the age of the private equity group) is added as an independent variable. This measure is strongly negatively correlated with the fund sequence variable. When added to the regression it leads to a decline in the magnitude and significance of the sequence variable. Column 3 shows that the coefficient goes down to 0.06 with a standard error of 0.05. In fact, if we include the age of the private equity partnership by itself without controlling for the sequence number of the fund, we find a negative coefficient, which is economically and statistically very significant (not reported in the paper). This suggests that younger private equity firms have more transfer constraints, which is consistent with our hypothesis that firms with a shorter track record must be more concerned about asymmetric information problems. We think, however, that the sequence number of the fund is a more accurate proxy of information asymmetry, since it reflects the amount of prior information that is available for each fund.
We isolate the longitudinal variation in the third and fourth columns, where we employ fixed effects for each private equity group. The within-firm specification allows us to control for unobserved differences across private equity firms. Thus, we can estimate the longitudinal effect on transfer constraints when a private equity firm raises its second, third, and later funds. Since private equity firms very rarely change between different sub-classes (for example, moving from buyout to early stage investing is challenging indeed), the coefficients on the buyout and early stage dummies are not meaningful in this specification. We repeat the estimation in the fifth column, leaving out these variables. Again, we see that the sign of the sequence variable is positive and statistically significant and the magnitude of the coefficient is basically unchanged from the fourth column.
Unfortunately, we cannot apply this within-firm estimation to the cross sectional tests of whether the location (California versus Massachusetts) or the industry focus of the partnership matter for the transferability of stakes. Virtually no funds change the location of their headquarters during the time period. (This pattern is not unique to the funds in our sample, but rather a common feature of the industry.) Therefore, it is impossible to measure the effect of changes in these characteristics on the transferability of partnership stakes.
Instead, we use simple cross-sectional tests to estimate the correlation between the liquidity of partnership shares and the observable characteristics of interest, such as the location of the fund. In all these estimations, we also include year fixed effects. To assess the potential impact of fund-specific heterogeneity on the coefficients of these dummy variables, we re-estimate the results while subsequently including a number of fund-specific variables, and analyze how they affect these coefficients. If the size of the coefficients on the variables of interest does not change much after including additional control variables, we can feel more comfortable that these results are not purely driven by unobserved, fund-specific heterogeneity.
Column 5 of Table 4 shows that the coefficient on the California dummy is positive and significant, while the other regional dummies are insignificant. California private equity funds are less concerned about transfers of their partnership stakes than the average private equity firm. In the sixth column, we include control variables for the logarithm of fund size and dummies for buyout versus venture funds. Even after including these covariates, the size of the coefficient on the California dummy does not change significantly. It is statistically significant in all specifications and the point estimate of the coefficient goes down by only 15 percent, from 2.86 to 2.45. If the coefficient on the California dummy was purely driven by unobservable heterogeneity between funds, we would expect the size of this coefficient to be smaller and statistically less significant once we include the other cross-sectional controls. The idea is that if the main source of variation between California and East Coast firms is the unobservable heterogeneity, including additional firm-specific controls should capture some of this underlying heterogeneity, and therefore, the significance of the initial variable would be reduced.
The interpretation of the difference between buyout and venture funds in the transferability of partnership interests is less clear-cut. Table 4 shows that the coefficients on the dummies for earlystage venture funds are significantly positive, and those for buyout funds negative and sometimes significant. As above, we also analyzed how the coefficient changes with the addition of other control variables in unreported regressions. In general, and quite differently from the effects on the location dummies, we find that the significance and the size of the coefficient of the buyout and venture dummies are reduced with each additional control variable.
We also include dummies for the different industry foci of the private equity funds. Column 7 shows that funds with a focus on the pharmaceutical industry have significantly more transfer constraints than the average. Similarly, funds that specialize in software and Internet ventures have many fewer constraints than the average fund. Practitioners assert that investment cycles in the pharmaceutical industries are particularly long. Therefore, GPs in this sector will be subject to information asymmetries for a prolonged time period. Consistent with our theory, these funds are more concerned about preventing transfers of equity stakes.
Finally, we look at the time series variation in transferability provisions to analyze whether funds that are raised in boom times show a different reliance on these provisions than funds that are raised in busts. We do not find a clear empirical pattern in the data (not reported). This does not seem surprising given the institutional features of the venture capital industry. On the one hand, during boom times, there is a lot of money flowing into the industry and capital is much easier to come by. This would suggest a reduced need for transferability constraints. On the other hand, boom times lead to a change in the composition of private equity investors. Specifically, in these times we see a large inflow of less liquid investors who are not committed to the asset class in the long run, e.g., individuals and modest-sized pension funds. Therefore, GPs will have an increased need to screen LPs to avoid the negative stigma associated with short-term investors who will drop out of the market when the industry goes through a downturn (i.e., exactly when liquidity is most precious). Given these countervailing effects it is not obvious ex ante that there should be a clear-cut prediction about the correlation between transfer constraints and market liquidity.
Robustness Checks
One might be concerned that our proposed composite measures weigh all provisions equally (restrictive, facilitating, and regulatory constraints), which might over or understate the importance of one of these categories relative to the other. For instance, on average there are more facilitating provisions than restrictive ones in our sample. If, however, restrictive provisions had more "bite", a simple sum of the number of restrictions would overstate the ease of transferability of the partnership interests.
Therefore, in Table 5 , we separate the contract provisions into those that facilitate and those that restrict transfers. Again we find evidence that supports our main hypothesis. The first and second columns report that the number of provisions that enhance fund transfers increase for later funds. These results indicate that our findings are not simply driven by the dynamics of netting out the different types of provisions. We also rerun these two specifications excluding any provision that could be motivated by compliance with regulatory considerations, e.g., provisions that affect the tax status or partnership status of the fund. The results (not reported) are qualitatively unchanged relative to results reported in Table 5 .
We also want to make sure that the changes in contract provisions are not purely driven by mere editorial changes in these contracts, but that they reflect substantive factors in the transferability of stakes. Ideally, we would like to obtain data of actual trades that happened or even attempted sales that are blocked. The data were impossible to collect. As the second-best alternative, we talked to lawyers specializing in private equity and consulted the related legal literature to determine which provisions are generally considered most important and restrictive. Provisions that give the general partners the right to approve of transfers and to prevent any transfer that conflicts with their interests are generally believed to be the most critical restrictions. The results using these restrictions only are reported in the third and fourth columns of Table 5 . Parallel to the prior results, we find that the coefficient on the sequence variable is negative and significant when firm fixed-effects are used. 22
Testing the Assumptions of the Model
Two central assumptions of our model are that (1) LPs learn about the GP's quality when investing in his fund and thus face lower information asymmetries, and (2) there is considerable persistence in the composition of limited partners across the different funds raised by a given private equity organization. In this section, we present two tests that support the assumptions of our model. 22 In Table 5 , we also report for the sake of completeness regression analyses using the measure of contractual complexity as the independent variable. We also separately estimate for each of the contract provisions a probability model (not reported here) of the likelihood of being included in later funds. Consistent with the findings of the composite measures, we observe that for restrictive provisions the probability of being included in the contract declines over time, and vice versa for facilitating provisions.
LPs Learn about GP Quality
One of the important assumptions of our model is that investors can gain insider knowledge about the underlying quality of the funds they invest in. To test this idea, we collect information on the private equity investments of two large and sophisticated LPs that provided us with some of the original contract information. It is virtually impossible to collect this type of information for a large set of LPs. 23 The LPs who provided us with the data are very large and long horizon investors.
Their decision to reinvest in a partnership is primarily based on the expectations of a fund's future returns and is not driven by temporary liquidity shocks.
The idea is to analyze whether partnerships in which the LPs did not choose to participate (which we will term discontinued funds) subsequently performed worse than those in which they did choose to reinvest (continued funds). In a second step, we then investigate if the future fundraising ability of a partnership is correlated with an LP's decision to discontinue investment into that partnership.
For that purpose, we separate funds into two groups: the ones that are discontinued and those that are reinvested. We match these two different subsets of funds anonymously to individual fund performance data from Venture Economics. 24 Our initial sample contained 111 decisions whether to invest in a follow-on fund or not prior to the end of 1997. (We use this cut-off date because we wished to insure that there is a sufficient period over which the fund's performance can be measured.) 12 observations were duplicate funds, which we dropped from the sample, and 7 could not be matched to Venture Economics data. This left us with the 92 funds, 70 that are continued and 22 that are not.
The measure of returns that we use in this sample is the total value of distributions to investors divided by paid-in-capital, net of management fee and carried interest at the end of a fund's life (or at the time that Venture Economics provided the data). This is a standard performance measure used in the VC industry and is provided by Venture Economics. The measure is easy to interpret and simple to benchmark with the market average. The drawback is that it does not take into account the exact timing of cash flows. Therefore, we also replicate our tests using internal rate of return (IRR) as an alternative performance measure (not reported here) and the results are qualitatively unchanged. We do not use any measures of interim fund performance, since these largely reflect differences in reporting practices by different funds and do not represent actual economic outcomes. 25 Panel A of Table 6 reports the descriptive statistics of the reinvested funds versus those that were discontinued. In Table 6 , we report raw results without market adjustment. The average realized returns of funds that were discontinued is slightly lower than that of reinvested funds, 170 percent versus 213 percent. These are total returns over the lifetime of the funds, on average about eight to ten years. We note that on average the funds in our LP sample have significantly higher returns than the industry average. 26 This result suports the assetion that the limited partners that provided us with the investment data are quite sophisticated. We then present the adjusted return: the return less the mean return of all private equity funds formed in that same year. (Since venture capital investments have very long horizons and are rarely marked to market, it is difficult to find the right benchmark for returns.) We find that market adjusted returns for the funds that were subsequently dropped by our LPs are significantly lower than for those that were continued.
Continued funds outperformed the VC industry by 21 percent on average, while discontinued funds had excess returns of negative 36 percent. The difference is now much more significant because more funds were discontinued during years when venture returns were attractive.
We also find that funds that were discontinued on average are somewhat larger than those that were reinvested. This finding may reflect the fact that many sophisticated LPs refuse to invest in funds that grow too quickly (see, for instance, Lerner (2000) . Once we examine the follow-on funds of these partnerships (the funds raised after the one in which the LPs made their decision to invest or not), we see that the discontinued funds seem to grow less. This result suggests that these discontinued funds encountered difficulties, or that the decision of the sophisticated LPs not to invest served as a negative signal to other LPs.
While the univariate statistics are in line with the assumptions of our model, it is more informative to look at the results of multivariate analysis. In Panel B of Table 6 , we regress the realized IRR of the fund on a dummy for whether the fund was continued or reinvested and controls for the type of fund (VC versus buyout) and year fixed effects. (We find that VC funds have better per-formance than buyout funds, consistent with the overall Venture Economics data (2002).) Column 1 of Table 6 shows that funds that the LPs decided to reinvest in, on average, have significantly higher performance than those that were discontinued. The coefficient on the continuation dummy is 16.02 (a 16% greater annualized rate of return), with a standard error of 6.75. These results suggest that investors can anticipate when the returns of the subsequent funds of the private equity organizations in which they invested will not be satisfactory.
In column 2 of Panel B, we repeat the above estimation using the returns of the subsequent fund that the GP raised as the dependent variable. We seek to test whether LPs can predict the subsequent performance of the partnership's future funds. There are 16 cases for which we do not have information on the returns of the follow-on fund. We believe that some of the missing observations are due to the failure of the partnership to raise a subsequent fund, which is the strongest response to expected poor performance. (Since the data was given to us in anonymous fashion, we cannot check independently whether these funds did not raise a follow-on fund or whether the information is just missing in the data.) A smaller fraction of funds was missing from the set of continued funds than from the discontinued funds. If were we able to adequately adjust for groups that failed to raise a subsequent fund, we anticipate that this correction would make our results stronger. But because of data limitations, we simply drop the funds for which we do not have subsequent performance measures. We regress the realized returns of a partnership's next fund on the same right hand side variables as in column 1 of Panel B. We find that partnerships that are discontinued by these LPs subsequently performed worse in their next fund than those that were reinvested.
Finally, in Columns 3 and 4 of Panel B, we investigate the relationship between the size of the subsequent fund a partnership raises and the decision of an LP to discontinue investment. In Column 3 we regress the logarithm of the size of the next fund on a dummy for whether the LP decided to reinvest and the usual control variables. We also include the size of the current fund as a control for underlying differences in partnership sizes. We find that funds that are continued by the LPs subsequently raise larger funds than those that are discontinued. The results hold if we use the percentage change in fund size from the current to the future fund, as we show in column 4 of Panel B.
However, we find that on average funds which are raised immediately after the LPs decide to discontinue the investment into a partnership are larger than the ones that are continued. This seems to run counter to our theory, which would predict that the fund directly after the decision to drop is made should also suffer from the "lemons" problem. There are two countervailing effects that might explain this finding. First, we cannot observe if these funds might have been even larger had the LP not dropped the given fund from their portfolio. Second, from conversations with practitioners we understand that many sophisticated LPs tend to drop funds once they become extremely large. However, the decision to drop a fund is often made after the other LPs have already committed to the fund. Therefore the negative information about an LP discontinuing investments might only be incorporated in the follow-on fund of the partnership.
LP Continuity across Partnerships
Another critical assumption is that a considerable degree of continuity exists across the limited partners between different funds of a private equity partnership. To address this question, we obtained information on the actual composition of limited partners for a subset of the private equity organizations in our sample. Unfortunately we were only able to get this information for a very small subset of private equity organizations (in total 11 organizations with at least two funds each), since many limited partners are bound by confidentiality agreements with GPs. We hand collected the information on LP names from the individual signature sheets at the back of the agreements.
One feature of the signature sheets that complicates our analysis greatly is that many of the larger partnerships use collective titles for large subsets of investors in the follow-on funds, e.g. "XX Partnership investors." Moreover, many wealthy individuals seem to change their investment intermediary between funds. For example, in the original fund a person might invest directly in the fund, in which case the person's own name would appear in the signature sheet. The next time around an intermediary, e.g. a bank, might invest on his or her behalf in which case we would only see an entry that says "Citibank as Investment Manager for account Y." Even though the LP continued to invest in the partnership, we would not be able to track the LP in this case. These factors lead to a strong downward bias in the amount of continuity we can hope to see. But even with these limitations of the data we find strong persistence in the set of limited partners that invest in a fund. On average, more than 55 percent of the LPs in our sample reinvest in a partnership if they are invested in the current fund. If we look at the subset of partnerships for which we can trace all LPs unambiguously across funds (6 private equity organizations) the fraction of repeat investors goes up to 84 percent. This large amount of persistence in the composition of LPs seems to be in line with the general view in the industry. 27
Examining an Alternative Hypothesis
One alternative explanation for the fact that funds with longer track records have less onerous restrictions is that well-established funds have much more powerful and entrenched GPs. Such an established private equity investor may not be as easily pushed around by trouble-making investors. While less established GPs may use transferability constraints to deter troublesome LPs, established GPs may not need not worry as much about keeping such investors out and thus rely less on transferability constraints. This alternative story, however, that harassment of general partners is confined to those LPs who are deterred by liquidity constraints seems to run counter to a considerable degree of anecdotal evidence. When we look at the recent history of the private equity industry, much of the public activism has been driven by California Public Employees' Retirement Fund which, with over $150 billion in assets, has "deep pockets" indeed. A number of major university endowments also have very knowledgeable private equity professionals, who have not been reserved about pointing out behavior that they find troublesome (e.g., see the discussions in Swensen (2000) ). Thus, if a GP seeks to deter troublesome LPs, it seems unlikely that the adoption of transferability constraints will be effective.
Second, the claim that established GPs pay less attention to provisions in partnership agreements contradicts the evidence presented in Gompers and Lerner (1996) . The authors examine provisions that constrain the activities of general partners in venture capital funds. Under the alternative hypothesis, it might be anticipated that established funds would have as many restrictions as their less established counterparts. Since they would not need to worry about being harassed by limited partners, established GPs should then not go through the time-consuming process of seeking to have restrictions removed, and instead simply use their older partnership agreements as 27 Given the very small sample size it is not a meaningful exercise to relate the fraction of repeat investors in these funds with our measures of tightness of transfer constraints. a template. 28 In actuality, the authors find that funds raised by more established venture organizations have significantly fewer restrictions. For instance, a fund raised by a group one decade older than the average had 25% fewer restrictions on the general partners' activities than one raised by a group at the mean of the independent variables.
Finally, when we look at actual concessions made to LPs, we find that established GPs are actually more accommodating than their less established peers. We examine the venture capital funds raised during the "technology bubble" period of 1999-2000, when LPs had an enormous appetite for venture capital investments. In many cases, funds were raised on terms that were subsequently perceived as unfair to the limited partners: e.g., with extraordinary levels of management fees. In the following , we examine which funds made concessions to their LPs during this period.
We expect that these decisions will be associated with larger funds, as well as those partnerships that raised significantly more capital than in the previous fund and the original target. But we are particularly interested in examining if more established groups are less willing to make concessions, as the alternative hypothesis would suggest.
To undertake this analysis, we first identified all venture capital funds which had a final closing in 1999 and 2000. We eliminate buyout funds, funds-of-funds, and funds based outside the United States. To identify these funds, we used the annual "Fundraising Round-Up" section of the January edition of the Private Equity Analyst, from which we recorded the fund's name, the year of final close, location, original target, and final size. 29 We then identify the size of venture capital organizations' previous fund and the year that the private equity organization was founded from various sources, including Galante's Venture Capital and Private Equity Directory, Pratt's Guide to Venture Capital Sources, The Fitzroy Dearborn 28 Indeed, if limited partners desired to have such restrictions added -perhaps to impress the investment committees that oversee them with the "toughness" of their bargaining -the GPs might acquiesce to the addition of such restrictions.
29 In four cases, the targeted fund size was not available. In these instances, we assumed the target fund size bore the same relationship to the actual fund size as that of the median fund. (In the median case, the actual fund raised was approximately 5 percent larger than the original target.) The results did not change materially if we assumed instead that the target fund size was the actual fund size or simply eliminated these observations.
International Directory of Venture Capital Funds, the venture organizations' web sites, and press accounts in Lexis-Nexis. In half-a-dozen cases, we were unable to determine the size of the previous fund. (In many more cases, of course, the fund raised in 1999 or 2000 was a first-time fund, so there was no earlier fund.) 30 We identified venture capital concessions (through end of December 2002) from a variety of press accounts as well as discussions with experienced limited partners and venture capitalists. It is difficult to assess how complete our listing is, but given the intense press scrutiny of these moves, we believe that our coverage is quite good. Table 7 presents the basic patterns. Panel A reports the results of univariate tests of the several key measures, divided between those associated with funds that did and did not make concessions.
Funds that make concessions are disproportionately larger and raised by more established venture organizations. There are no significant patterns, however, when we examine the percentage difference between the fund's size and either the original target or the previous fund size.
Panel B reports the results of logit regression analyses, where the dependent variable is a dummy indicating that the fund made a concession to its limited partners. The independent variables include the size of the fund (in millions of current dollars), the percentage change from the original target to the amount raised, the age of the fund, and controls denoting funds raised in 2000 and based in California and Massachusetts. Our rationale for including a dummy variable for 2000 is that these funds largely closed after the initial decline in technology equities (fundraising is concentrated in the final months of the calendar year). The inclusion of dummies for these two states is motivated by the fact that they account for nearly 60% of the venture funds during this period. The first regression uses all observations, and denotes first-time funds with a dummy.
The second regression only employs follow-on funds, and includes as an independent variable the 30 We denoted as first funds cases where partners from existing funds rearranged themselves -e.g., Redpoint, where partners from two established venture group joined together -or where some partners from an established group left to establish a fund of their own. If, however, the group was simply renamed, we did not consider it a new fund. A complication was introduced by groups that raised funds "out of sequence": e.g., if a generalist Fund III was followed by a smaller Genomics Fund dedicated solely to biotechnology investments. The fund previous to the Genomics Fund would be Fund III. When Fund IV was raised, though, we used Fund III as the previous fund, not the Genomics Fund, since it is more directly comparable. Another complication was introduced by venture funds that were raised by private equity groups that made buyout investments. Our algorithm was to regard this as a follow-on fund as long as it operated under the same name. If the fund was raised under a different name (e.g., Bain Capital's Brookside Capital), it was considered a first fund. If the firm raised two funds with the same investment focus that closed simultaneously (typically one geared towards domestic investors, and one geared toward overseas investors), we consolidated the amount and treated it as if it were a single fund.
percentage change in the size of the previous and the current fund.
The coefficient on the age variable, 0.06, suggests that more established funds are more willing to make concessions to their limited partners. This result holds even when we control for the size of the fund, the amount raised relative to the original target, and the amount raised relative to the earlier fund. Nor is the result insignificant in magnitude: at the mean of the independent variables, a one standard deviation increase in fund age increases the predicted probability of a concession by 76% (from 2.5% to 4.4%). This result runs directly counter to the alternative hypothesis, which argues that more established funds are particularly effective at resisting demands from limited partners.
We explore the robustness of these results in several ways in unreported regressions. We alter the assumptions in regard to the treatment of missing observations. Because there is a very large dispersion in fund size (from $7 million to $2.2 billion), we employ the logarithm of this measure instead. We also employ dummy variables for additional states where these funds were raised.
These changes have little impact on the results. 31
Interpreting the Results
We are cautious to emphasize that our empirical results should be viewed as suggestive evidence for the theoretical framework that we have developed in the paper. Obviously, there are a number of potential omitted variables in the cross-sectional estimations that we cannot control for, partly because they are truly unobservable and partly because of the serious restrictions in the disclosure of information in the private equity industry. But we believe that these results are interesting despite these potential data shortcomings, since they provide new insights into the interaction between private equity funds and their investors, an area that has been very difficult to analyze previously.
We think that the positive relationship between the ease of transferability and the sequence number of the private equity fund (estimated based on within-group changes) is the strongest 31 It may be possible that a more complex alternative hypothesis can explain the empirical facts seen above. Small, less liquid LPs may engage in a variety of unproductive activities that annoy GPs. GPs may thus seek to eliminate such potential investors through the use of transferability constraints. Screening out such investors may be a major concern of less established GPs. More established general partners, who may draw upon a higher caliber of limited partners, may thus not need to worry about such behaviors, and as a result do not bother to impose transferability constraints. While such a hypothesis may fit the observed empirical patterns regarding the use of transferability restrictions, it runs against other observed patterns in the private equity industry, such as the way in which major LPs have played the dominant role in pushing for reforms of the industry.
evidence in support of our theory. Most alternative stories for transfer restrictions would imply either a negative coefficient on the sequence variable or no effect. An alternative theory that has been mentioned is that general partners want to reduce the liquidity of their stakes to avoid the transaction costs of raising capital in future rounds. Even though this theory could explain why there might be transfer restrictions in the first place, it cannot easily predict the dynamic effects that we document. In fact, if we assume that the value of the general partners' time increases over time, since they have more outside opportunities, we would actually predict the opposite sign. It is particularly striking that transfer constraints are less stringent for follow-on funds, if we consider that the bargaining power between limited partners and funds shifts towards the general partners once these have been able to establish a track record. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that any industry-wide changes in bargaining power (these could be due to shifts in the supply and demand of capital) will not affect our estimates, since we are controlling for year fixed effects in all our specifications.
In the supplemental analysis, we show that LPs are able to acquire inside information about the quality of a partnership during the investment process, and that the subsequent fundraising ability of a partnership is lower when an inside investor decides not to reinvest. We also show that there is typically a considerable degree of continuity among the LPs who invest in different funds of the same partnership. These results support the assumptions made in our model. More generally, we think that they provide interesting evidence on the importance of asymmetric information in the interaction between private equity fund managers and their investors.
Finally, we examine the alternative hypothesis that the transferability restrictions may be used to deter troublesome LPs. Established GPs may not be as concerned about these LPs, and thus eschew these provisions. We present a variety of anecdotal and statistical evidence that is inconsistent with this alternative suggestion.
Conclusion
This paper examines the rationales for restrictions on liquidity. It suggests an alternative to the governance-based rationale traditionally offered for such curbs, focusing on the private equity industry. The model suggests that imposing restrictions on the liquidity of investor ownership stakes may enable managers, in our case GPs of private equity groups, to influence the composition of investors. We explicitly model liquidity constraints as a choice variable that allows the GP to alleviate the adverse selection problem in follow-on fund raising by screening for "deep pocket" investors.
We test these predictions in the context of the private equity industry. We find that consistent with our theory, funds that are less prone to asymmetric information have fewer transfer constraints.
For example, later funds of the same private equity firm have fewer transfer constraints, consistent with the idea that these funds are less affected by information asymmetries, since the firm has established a track record. Moreover, funds that operate in industries with longer investment cycles have more constraints. Also, funds in the close-knit California private equity environment have fewer constraints than East Coast funds, where information may travel more slowly. We also present evidence consistent with the assumptions of the model. In particular, we are able to show that the existing investors of a fund are able to obtain inside information about the quality of the partnership.
The applications of these ideas are much broader and more general than the private equity setting. Many corporate finance transactions impose restrictions that are in excess of what are required by securities law. Exploring the extent to which some of these same rationales may be at work is a natural extension of this analysis. An understanding of these issues, however, is particularly urgent in the private equity industry. In the past few years, there has been a surge of interest on the part of limited partners in liquidating their holdings. In some cases, these groups have sought to reduce their overall exposure to private equity; in other instances, they have sought to garner "dry powder" for further private equity investments (for a discussion, see Toll (2000)). As the theoretical analysis above suggests, such moves have the potential to have very positive features, but also to impose substantial costs. Thus, gaining a better understanding of the tradeoffs associated with liquidity is important to academics and practitioners alike.
in an established securities market" or "readily tradable on a secondary market or the substantial equivalent thereto" 35 may be designated publicly traded partnerships (also known as master limited partnerships). The central test is whether the trading volume in these partnership interests on such exchanges exceeds 2 percent of the pool's capital or profit share. Publicly traded partnerships are generally treated as corporations for income tax purposes -i.e., earnings are taxed at the entity as well as the partner level, rather than just at the partner level -which is highly disadvantageous to the partners. Table 2 Summary of the provisions used to construct the dependent variables in the analyses. The first column indicates how often the contractual term regarding transferability is found in the 243 partnership agreements in the sample. The second through fifth columns indicates whether the measure is included in the construction of the four composite measures used in the analysis below. A "+" sign indicates that the presence of the provision was regarded as a favorable indication in constructing the variable; a "-" sign that its presence was regarded as a negative indication. 
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